Introduction
"Is bigger better?" 1 While evidence on the effects of municipal mergers becomes more and more settled, studies on mergers of larger county administrations are fairly rare. In this paper, we assess both fiscal and political effects of county mergers in two different institutional settings. Many countries run multi-tier systems of local government. For example, counties serve as the upper-local level of local government below the state level in the US and in Ireland, Landkreise in Germany, or Bezirke in Austria. In this paper, we define counties as local jurisdictions with some degree of self-autonomy around the average population of US counties (100,000) representing the second local government tier in countries with at least two subnational tiers. County-sized administrations provide public services and goods, which are more than local in nature but cover less than a federal state or country -education and social care are prominent examples. Institutions and responsibilities of counties, however, differ widely across countries.
In past decades, some OECD countries changed the number of county-sized administrations through mergers and split-offs (see Table 1 ). We select 12 OECD countries which currently run county administrations. Sweden, Portugal and Norway marginally decreased the number of counties in the last six decades; Ireland and especially transitioning countries such as Hungary, Turkey or Estonia drastically increased the number of counties in the last decades. Luxembourg sticks to the number of counties as of 1950, the number of counties in the US also varies relatively little. Among OECD countries, Germany is an exceptional outlier and merged counties a great deal. German state governments expect that increases in county administrations deliver cost reductions through scale effects or economies of scope, and merged counties to a large extent. 2 Between 1950 and 2013, the number of counties virtually halves. Austria, on the contrary, increased the numbers of counties slightly in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s but started merger reforms at the county level in recent years. 3 The number of districts changed both in countries with elected district representation (local councils and/or governors) as well as in countries where districts are run by appointed rather than elected governments (see Table 1 ).
[ Table 1 about here]
Because county mergers are rare, the exceptional case of Germany notwithstanding, very little is known whether enlarging county administrations actually pays off. Studies mainly focus on the municipal level. Almost all quasi-experimental studies which offer a causal interpretation do not show that mergers reduce total expenditures (Lüchinger und Stutzer 2002, Moisio und Uusitaalo 2013, Allers und Geertsma 2016 , Blesse und Baskaran 2016 , Blom-Hansen et al. 2016 , Fritz 2016 , Studerus 2016 , Harjunen et al. 2017 , Sandsør et al. 2017 ); Reingewertz (2012) being the sole exception. 4 Voter turnout in local elections, by contrast, seems to decrease (Fritz and Feld 2015 , Koch und Rochat 2017 , Lapointe et al. 2018 . Studies also focus on city-county mergers which are a very specific form of county mergers (Blume and Blume 2007, Tang and Hewings 2017) . Researchers, however, do not investigate mergers of county-sized multi-purpose administrations yet. 5 The sole exception for studies on mergers of rural counties is Roesel 2 Internalization of spatial externalities (spill-over) might be another reason for merger reforms. Spill-over may cause an underprovision of publicly provided goods. Mergers may then lead to an increase in expenditures. Spillover, however, do not play a major role in the discussion of merger reforms in Germany which were always intended to cut spending. 3 Austria increased the number of districts for two main reasons. First, after Nazi Germany annexed Austria in 1938, few districts were merged. In the 1950s, the Austrian government re-established those districts. Second, Austria experienced a large increase in population after WWII from around 7 million inhabitants in 1950 to around 8.5 million today. Therefore, some districts were split -for example, in the booming West Austrian state of Vorarlberg (district of Dornbirn). 4 Blesse and Roesel (2017) provide a comprehensive overview on the literature on municipal merger reforms.
There are also studies that do not use quasi-experimental methods such as difference-in-differences estimations (for example, Hanes 2015) . We abstract from the results of these studies because they do not offer a causal interpretation. 5 Swianiewicz and Łukomska (2017) recently study splits of Polish counties and find that smaller counties lead to an increase in administrative costs but not in other budgetary category in the Polish case. There are also studies on (2017) who applied the synthetic control method to state-level aggregated data. The author does not show cost reductions. Instead, he finds that voter turnout in county council elections decreases and support for right-wing populists increases significantly.
In this paper, we investigate both fiscal and political effects of county mergers in different institutional settings. We apply difference-in-differences estimations to county merger reforms in Austria and Germany, which are comparable in terms of language, culture, and the style of administration. In both countries, some counties were amalgamated while others remain un- German counties, and right-wing populists seem to gain additional support. We conclude that political costs clearly outweigh the fiscal null benefits of county merger reforms -independent of the institutional background.
mergers of special-purpose jurisdictions such as school districts (Brasington 1999 , Duncombe and Yinger 2007 , Knight and Gordon 2008 .
Institutional background

County mergers in Saxony-Anhalt (Germany) 2007
Government in Germany is shared among the federal level, the 16 federal states, and around 11,300 local governments. and no other German state implemented county merger reforms in the last twenty years. We therefore limit our analysis to Saxony-Anhalt only.
Until the present day, there was no evaluation of the county merger reform. Opinion polls from 2017 however show that only 30% of all citizens are pleased with the reform; 45% are somewhat or strongly dissatisfied. 9 Newspapers also report that costs increased after the reform.
10
However, it remains unclear whether increases can be attributed to the merger reform. We will address this issue in our analysis later on.
[ Figure 1 about here]
County mergers in Styria (Austria) 2012/2013
The institutional background of counties (Bezirke) in Austria differs to large extent from Ger- 
Empirical strategy
Data
We collect annual data on expenditures in different categories, on the number of staff, and on political economy outcomes (voter turnout, party vote shares) for all counties of the German state of Saxony-Anhalt for the period 1995 to 2016 from official publications. Data are not available for some years; column (5) in the descriptive statistics (Table 2) provides an overview.
Fiscal data refer to expenditures per capita on staff, materials, rents, maintenance, interest payments and investments. We do not transfer data to constant prices because time fixed effects entirely cover changes in price levels and inflation rates were comparably low. We measure staff as the number of employees or the number full time equivalents per capita. Finally, we use data of 1999, 2004, 2007/2009 , and 2014 county council elections, and compute voter turnout and vote shares for right-wing populist parties 13 and independent non-partisan lists and candidates.
[ 
Identification
Our main empirical strategy is to compare merged counties to non-merged counties within the same German or Austrian federal state over time. This allows us to abstract from heterogeneity across federal states in terms of responsibilities of counties. For identification, we estimate several difference-in-differences models using OLS in the following way; we run separate estimations for Saxony-Anhalt and Styria:
is the observed outcome of county in period (expenditures per capita, staff per capital, political economy outcome) which we include in logs. and represent county and year fixed effects. County fixed effects cover unobservable heterogeneity across counties (i.e., time-invariant preferences toward spending and staff). Time effects eliminate events that affect all counties within a state simultaneously. is the difference-in-differences estimator and our coefficient of interest; the interaction components and -are collinear to county and time fixed effects and drop out.
′ is a vector of covariates. We include logged total population to control for growth effects. In the case of Saxony-Anhalt, we also include dummies for counties that switched to accrual accounting and for counties that run a decentralised public employment service on their own behalf (Optionskommunen). Finally, describes the error term. We use robust standard errors (Huber 1967 , White 1980 without clustering of standard errors because the number of potential clusters is by far too low (11 and 12). Note that, clustering standard errors on the county level, however, would not change our results.
Because the decision to merge individual counties are hardly exogenous, the parallel or common trend assumption is crucial for our difference-in-differences identification strategy. Our empirical model proposes that in the absence of the merger reform, outcomes in merged counties would have evolved in a similar fashion than in non-merged counties. The difference-indifferences estimator captures the difference between the actual development (with reform) and its counterfactual counterpart (no reform). For Styria, we cannot test pre-reform trends because we observe one pre-reform period only. For the case of Saxony-Anhalt, we can visualise prereform trends at least for expenditure and staff figures where we can rely on longer and more frequent time series. Figure 2 show that pre-reform trends in expenditures per capita and in staff per capita does not differ among counties that were merged and those that were not merged in 2007. In some expenditure categories, for example, maintenance, pre-reform levels differ. Interestingly, pre-reform expenditure levels were already lower in counties intended to merge.
Despite differences in levels, trends in all variables are parallel. Therefore, we are confident to propose that parallel trends would have continued for all variables under investigation in the absence of the 2007 merger reform, and our difference-in-differences estimator captures the causal reform effect quite well. [ Figure 2 about here]
Results
Fiscal effects
We now test expenditure effects of county merger reforms in the difference-in-differences regression setup described above. The upper panel of Table 3 shows the results for different expenditure categories in the German state of Saxony-Anhalt. The results confirm our "eyeball econometrics" impressions from Figure 2 : we do not find significant cost reductions in any expenditure category. By contrast, expenditures for rents increase rather than decrease in merged counties, which might be a result of the reorganization of county administrations: Enlarged administrations quickly need larger buildings and offices in the new county capital. It takes some time to construct these buildings; administrations therefore may have to rent some further offices at least for the time of transition.
[ Table 3 about here]
As a robustness check, we also compute effects for individual years around the merger reform (see Table 4 ). The findings confirm our baseline results: We find significant increases in rent expenditures in merged counties but do not prove any cost reduction.
[ Table 4 about here]
Returning to Table 3 , we also assess the effects on staff. We do not find that mergers reduced staff per capita in the case of Saxony-Anhalt (columns (7) and (8)), which corroborates our null findings for staff expenditures. The same is true for the Austrian merger reform under investigation (see lower panel of Table 3 ). We do not find a significant effect of county mergers on staff or expenditures in any other administrative function at least 6 to 9 years after the merger reform. For two main reasons, the parallel findings for Germany and Austria are of crucial importance. First, Austrian counties are by far smaller than the German ones. Null effects in find null effects in the Austrian case rejecting this hypothesis. Second, the Austrian case allows us to rule out that political economy drives the results. In the German case, a local council decides on the annual budget. One (rather trivial) explanation why expenditures in merged counties may not change might be that local preferences do not change. In Austria, however, the state government decides on county staff and finance and may realize (potential) scale more easily. However, in neither case we observe a change in county staff.
Altogether, the results confirm prior findings that mergers of local administrations do not result in cost savings (see Blesse and Roesel 2017) . This finding may explain why only few countries applied merger reforms so far (Table 1) . Germany is the only exception. We argue that the German trend toward county mergers might not be driven by best-practice experiences, but might be rather a result of mimicking and yardstick competition. In Germany, not the central government but federal states decide on local government structures. In 1969, the state of Rhineland-Palatinate was the first state that implemented county mergers albeit the academic debate was not settled at the time (Hoffmann 1973 ). In 1970 , 1972 , 1973 , and 1974 , all other West German states followed the example of Rhineland-Palatinate, however, without investigating the outcomes of reforms in other states. 16 Because reforms quite often target mean county population in all other states, Germany saw a race to the top in terms of county population. In 2017, however, the states of Brandenburg and Thuringia stopped county mergers after large-scale protests that explicitly refer to the ineffectiveness of merger reforms in other states. 16 German state officials did not carry out or commissioned a reform evaluation for decades. Instead, officials argue that responsibilities of counties changed; pre-and post-reform figures were therefore not comparable (see, for example, Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, 10 Jahre Gebietsreform: Rosenhochzeit im Saalekreis ohne Liebe?, https://www.mz-web.de/merseburg/10-jahre-gebietsreform-rosenhochzeit-im-saalekreis-ohne-liebe--25137234). We account for changes in responsibilities because we compare merged to non-merged counties that both experienced the same changes in responsibilities.
Political effects
County mergers do not only amalgamate administrations but also, in the case of Germany, county councils. The number of county councillors sharply decrease and areas become unwieldy large. As a result, public goods may be provided less efficient because information asymmetries increase and preferences become more heterogeneous (Oates 1972) . Observers therefore worry that merger reforms may induce dissatisfaction, increase distances to the administration, and reduce political participation. Denters et al. (2014) document adverse effects of jurisdiction size on local democracy, especially in small municipalities. Hansen (2015) shows that satisfaction with the local administration and with the local democracy decreased in the course of Danish municipal mergers. The findings by Serritzlew (2011a, 2011b) suggest that this might be result of decreases in internal political efficacy, i.e., the ability to perceive and to understand processes in local politics. Citizens may not accept artificially constructed jurisdictions and react by abstaining from elections or voting for populist parties. Roesel (2016) provides some descriptive evidence for this effect. Second, voter turnout may decrease because election incentives decrease. Studies consistently show that voter turnout decrease in constituency size because the probability to be the pivotal voter decrease (for surveys see Cancela and Geys 2016, van Houwelingen 2017) . Third, larger counties may crowd out non-partisan candidates that cannot rely on party organizations, which are required to keep in touch with local problems in unwieldy large jurisdictions (Fritz und Feld 2015) .
We investigate whether merger reforms come with adverse effects on political outcomes related to these three hypothesis: voter turnout, vote shares for right-wing populists, and vote shares for non-partisan candidates. Table 5 shows for the case of Saxony-Anhalt that voter turnout in county council election decrease by 4.3 percentage points in merged counties compared to unmerged counties. This is fully in line with findings by Fritz and Feld (2015) , Koch and Rochat (2017) , and Lapointe et al. 2018 for municipal mergers in Germany, Switzerland, and Finland respectively. Vote shares for right-wing populists, by contrast, increase by around 1.8 percentage points, which is substantial given the mean right-wing populist vote share of 2.0 percent.
Finally, we do not find an effect on non-partisan candidate vote shares contrasting former findings for the municipal level (Fritz and Feld 2015) . Thus, county mergers do not affect lists of independent candidates. The results for Saxony-Anhalt entirely reproduce findings by Roesel (2017) for the neighboring state of Saxony that also merged counties: Voter turnout decrease, right-wing populists benefit, and vote shares for independent non-partisan candidates are not affected. Therefore, even against the background that most mergers in Saxony-Anhalt were somewhat voluntary and accepted by local councils, voters seem to protest against larger jurisdictions. Koch and Rochat (2017) report similar effects on voter turnout for Swiss municipalities where also local referenda on municipal mergers were held. Lapointe et al. 2018 elaborate on the Finish case. We conclude that based on our empirical findings also mergers on the county level may have adverse effects on local democracy.
[ Table 5 about here]
In the Austrian state of Styria, county administrations are formally part of the state government.
Therefore, we examine changes in political outcomes of the state elections 2010 (before mergers) and 2015 (after mergers). The results fairly replicate our findings for Saxony-Anhalt regarding the negative effects on voter turnout. We interpret this finding as suggestive evidence for protest against the compulsory merger reform by the state government. However, the connection between state elections and county mergers is much looser in Austria. Thus, we do not confirm an effect on right-wing populist vote shares. There were also no independent non-partisan candidates in Austrian state elections.
Conclusion
We have shown that county mergers do not pay off in terms of cost or staff reductions. Thereby, the institutional background does not matter: In Germany, counties act autonomously as upperlevel local governments. In Austria, by contrast, counties are decentralised administrations of the state government. We do neither show that mergers lead to scale effects in the German case nor in the Austrian case. Instead, voter turnout decrease and right-wing populists seem to gain additional support. Thus, political costs clearly outweigh fiscal null benefits of county merger reforms -independent of the institutional setting considered here.
However, our study has limitations, which further research may address. First, we stick to fiscal outcomes only but do not observe efficiency. If the same amount of money is spent for even more valuable projects, efficiency (output-input relations) increase even when costs remain constant. Our null effects in expenditures may mask these kind of efficiency improvements. A valuable avenue would be to address this issue, for example, by investigating changes in DEA (data envelopment analysis) scores of local administrations before and after merger reforms.
Second, we observe a rather low number of merged and unmerged counties. If researchers would like to investigate reforms where only one or few counties were merged (for example, Ireland, Israel, or Norway), the synthetic control method offers a reasonable framework (see Abadie et al. 2015) . Finally, we find robust and significant effects on political economy outcomes but can yet only hypothesise on the underlying channels. A highly valuable research question is why citizens abstain from voting in enlarged jurisdictions. Further research may address the mechanisms of adverse effects of merger reforms on local democracy in more detail. Full time equivalents 1995-2014 1995-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 1995-2014 2003-2016 2003-2016 Year 1995-2014 1995-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 1995-2014 2003-2016 2003-2016 Notes: The table shows the results of difference-in-differences estimations comparing nine merged counties to two unmerged counties in Saxony-Anhalt. Logged expenditures or staff per capita are the dependent variables. (Treat × After n years) denote the effects n years after the reform year 2017. Further controls: Dummies for counties with accrual accounting and with decentralised public employment service. We exclude the reform year 2007. Significance levels (Robust standard errors in brackets): *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.10. 
